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0042-6989/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.The critique of anchoring theory by Maniatis reﬂects a close
reading of the theory. My coauthors and I appreciate this and
welcome the opportunity to achieve greater clarity.
1. Status of edge classiﬁcation
Perhaps her most important charge is that edge classiﬁcation, a
key part of my earlier intrinsic image theory (Gilchrist, 1979), was
abandoned by anchoring theory but more recently, surreptitiously
re-introduced. In fact, edge classiﬁcation was never abandoned. It
morphed into the idea of framework segregation. The source of
the confusion lies in the following sentence: ‘‘...the belongingness
construction allows us to bypass the problem of edge classiﬁcation,
even though factors like edge sharpness and coplanarity, formerly
thought to underlie edge classiﬁcation, now show up as grouping
factors.’’ (Gilchrist et al., 1999, p. 805)
Some background is needed here. Anchoring theory emerged as
an attempt to account for the overall pattern of errors in surface
lightness perception, on the belief that the pattern of errors is
the signature of the visual software. The literature reveals many
kinds of lightness errors. But they fall into two broad classes: illu-
mination-dependent errors (historically called failures of con-
stancy) and background-dependent errors (historically called
illusions). Thus the main challenge for a theory of errors is to ﬁnd
a formula that can account for these two seemingly different clas-
ses. For anchoring theory, the link lies in the concept of frame of
reference, which had earlier been applied only to lightness con-
stancy (Koffka, 1935) and failures of lightness constancy (Kardos,
1934). However lightness illusions also typically seem to involve
frames of reference. Simultaneous lightness contrast, the proto-
type, is composed of two obvious side-by-side frameworks. Frame-
works are also prominent in the Benary effect (1924) and White’s
illusion (1979), and various reverse contrast illusions, to name a
few. As all these frameworks are supported by gestalt grouping
principles, they can also be treated as perceptual groups, and the
same can be said of illumination frameworks.
Of course the frameworks in these lightness illusions are not
bounded by illumination edges. But in the language of perceptual
grouping, segregation and grouping are intimately related; one is
roughly the ﬂip-side of the other. Thus the frameworks, or percep-
tual groups, central to anchoring theory depend on both segrega-
tion between frameworks (including edge classiﬁcation) and
consolidation within frameworks. Viewing frameworks as percep-
tual groups supported by both segregation and grouping factors
allows the Kardos idea of co-determination to be applied to both
broad classes of lightness errors, failures of illumination-indepen-
dent constancy and failures of background-independent constancy.Edge classiﬁcation retains an important role, but is supplemented
(bypassed if you will) by grouping processes.
Many of the arguments made by Maniatis are predicated on her
mistaken conclusion that edge classiﬁcation had been rejected by
anchoring theory.2. Anchoring theory of simultaneous contrast
Maniatis challenges the anchoring account of simultaneous
lightness contrast, speciﬁcally our claims that each of the two
gray targets is perceptually grouped with its immediate back-
ground and the two backgrounds are segregated from each other.
As for the ﬁrst of these, it seems self-evident that each target is
strongly grouped with its background, based on the important
factor of surroundedness. However, the segregation of the two
adjacent backgrounds is more problematic, especially given our
claim, quoted by Maniatis, that, ‘‘two surfaces that are coplanar,
adjacent and share a sharp boundary are maximally grouped for
illumination’’ (Gilchrist et al., 1999, p. 783). Clearly the two
backgrounds are coplanar and adjacent, and they share a sharp
boundary. Here Maniatis may have spotted a previously unno-
ticed (or at least under-appreciated) contradiction in our
writings.
Both sides of this apparent contradiction have ample support.
On the one hand, our claim that adjacent, coplanar, sharp-bounded
surfaces imply equal illumination (i.e., a single framework) is con-
sistent with many reports. In such a pair of surfaces, the darker
member is anchored by the lighter, such that the perceived reﬂec-
tance (lightness) of the darker surface can be predicted by the
luminance ratio of the darker surface to the lighter surface, multi-
plied by the perceived reﬂectance of the lighter surface. However,
the lightness value of the darker surface rises as it is moved later-
ally away from the lighter, while remaining coplanar (Cole &
Diamond, 1971; Dunn & Leibowitz, 1961; McCann & Savoy,
1991; Newson, 1958), as it is moved away from the lighter in
depth, while remaining retinally adjacent (Coren, 1969; Gogel &
Mershon, 1969; Kardos, 1934), or as it is rotated from the plane
of the lighter surface, while remaining adjacent along one edge
(Boyaci, Maloney, & Hersh, 2003; Ripamonti et al., 2004;
Wishart, Frisby, & Buckely, 1997). According to this logic, the adja-
cent black and white backgrounds of a simultaneous contrast dis-
play are part of a single framework.
On the other hand, the two halves of the display seem to func-
tion as frameworks. If the two backgrounds are articulated with
Mondrian-like patterns, the perceived difference between the tar-
gets increases, just as happens when ﬁelds of illumination are
articulated (Burzlaff, 1931; Katz, 1935). The same thing happens
when the two backgrounds are increased in size, suggesting they
are subject to the law of ﬁeld size, applied by Katz (1935) to ﬁelds
of illumination.
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distinction between conditions at a local edge and the larger con-
ﬁguration. If we ignore the larger pattern we must conclude that
the black and white backgrounds are part of a single framework.
But in addition there are grouping factors that produce sub-groups.
Each gray target is grouped with its background by sheer
adjacency, as anchoring theory suggests and as Maniatis notes.
Moreover, that adjacency is supplemented by surroundedness,
producing a stronger grouping.
Pressing her challenge, Maniatis writes, ‘‘The fact is that some
sharp boundaries produce the kind of segregation that leads to
constancy effects, some to contrast effects, and some to neither.’’
Again, you cannot look solely at what is happening at a local edge.
When a sharp boundary occurs at a depth boundary (either a cor-
ner or an occlusion edge) or when it crosses a ratio-invariant
X-junction, (strong) constancy effects result. When a sharp bound-
ary occurs without these factors, but other grouping factors are
present in the whole conﬁguration, (weaker) contrast effects
result.
It has often been noted that contrast and constancy effects go in
the same direction. That is, a target in the brighter region (either
brighter in illumination or higher in reﬂectance) appears darker
than a target of equal luminance in the darker region. Earlier this
led to attempts to account for lightness constancy using the same
lateral inhibitory mechanism thought to explain simultaneous
contrast (Cornsweet, 1970). Anchoring theory, conversely, suggests
that backgrounds of different reﬂectance function as weak frame-
works, even when they do not appear to differ in illumination
level.
Is this justiﬁed? Kardos noted that we do not have the experi-
ence of a ﬁeld of illumination just because an actual ﬁeld of illumi-
nation is present. That would be an example of the experience
error (Köhler, 1947). Perception of a ﬁeld of illumination must be
triggered by certain cues (factors, higher-order variables, call them
what you will). Surely we all accept this rather obvious point.
However it must be noted that these same cues can occur in the
absence of an actual ﬁeld of illumination. In these cases, according
to anchoring theory, they produce a weak effect in the same
direction.
Maniatis argues that the two targets in simultaneous contrast
should be grouped together because they lie in the same plane.
But in anchoring theory the targets are grouped together in one
framework, called the global framework, while at the same time
they are grouped separately into two local frameworks. Moreover,
their grouping together is held to be about nine times stronger
than their grouping in separate frameworks (Gilchrist, 2006, p.
317). Keep in mind that simultaneous contrast is a rather weak
illusion. If the targets were anchored totally in their local frame-
works, they would appear as different as black and white. If they
were anchored totally in the global framework they would appear
identical. Clearly the percept lies closer to the global prediction
than to the local.
3. Recognition of earlier ideas
Suggesting that we have been ‘‘careless in asserting ownership
of ideas’’ Maniatis cites two examples. The ﬁrst is that our claim
that the two main segmentation factors of fuzzy boundaries and
depth boundaries is ‘‘indistinguishable from the view attributed
by Gilchrist (2014) to Kardos (1934)’’. What exactly is her com-
plaint here? Kardos has repeatedly been given credit for these
ideas (Gilchrist, 2006; Gilchrist et al., 1999, pp. 66–74). Indeed
before the anchoring theory paper (Gilchrist et al., 1999) Kardos
had become virtually unknown. We have taken pains to insist that
Kardos be given more credit (Gilchrist, 2006; Gilchrist & Annan,
2002). Second, she notes that the claim by anchoring theory thatthe black and white backgrounds in simultaneous contrast func-
tion as weak frameworks ‘‘parallels the view of Helmholtz’’. Have
we been remiss in failing to note this parallel? Possibly.
Maniatis goes on to suggest that anchoring theory has added
nothing to these ideas. However, in the case of Kardos, anchoring
theory has extended his concept of co-determination to back-
ground-dependent failures of constancy (simultaneous contrast)
whereas Kardos had applied it only to illumination-dependent fail-
ures. In the case of Helmholtz, anchoring theory has shown that
the computationally difﬁcult requirement of estimating the illumi-
nation level can be replaced with the far more tractable problem of
grouping surfaces by common illumination. While no one has sug-
gested how illumination can be estimated, we know that regions of
common illumination are bounded by depth boundaries and
blurred boundaries (penumbrae). But it should be noted that the
problem of segmenting frameworks is not unique to anchoring
theory. In order to estimate the illumination level in adjacent spa-
tial ﬁelds of illumination, even Helmholtz would have to ﬁrst iden-
tify those ﬁelds.
4. A test of anchoring theory vs. intrinsic-image theory
Maniatis refers to an experiment (Arroyo, Annan, & Gilchrist,
1995; reported in Gilchrist et al., 1999) we called a critical test
because anchoring theory and my earlier intrinsic image theory
made opposite predictions. Brieﬂy, a spotlight is cast over half of
a rather simple Mondrian pattern. The lightest patch within the
spotlight is a middle gray square, which appears completely white
and lighter than a real white outside the spotlight. This counterin-
tuitive result is just what is predicted by anchoring theory, while
intrinsic image theory predicts the opposite (white perceived
lighter than middle gray). Maniatis raises a series of objections.
1. Maniatis asks how this result can be predicted by a theory that
‘‘apparently ignores obvious illumination boundaries’’. The
answer, as noted above, is that the theory does not ignore illu-
mination boundaries.
2. Maniatis states that we ‘‘viewed it as critical proof of the irrel-
evance of edge classiﬁcation’’. Not true. We viewed it as a crit-
ical test between the two theories, as was clearly stated in our
reports.
3. Maniatis then claims that the results and interpretation of
Arroyo et al. (1995) are contradicted by those of Radonjic and
Gilchrist (2013). It is not clear where there is a contradiction
here, andManiatis does not tell us. LikewiseManiatis claims that
the results and interpretation of Arroyo et al. (1995) contradict
those of Gilchrist, Delman, and Jacobsen (1983). Again, there is
no obvious contradiction in the results. As for the interpretations
offered in these 1983 and 1995 papers, they do indeed contradict
one another because the earlier paper was written from the per-
spective of intrinsic image theory (Gilchrist, 1979), which was
subsequently rejected in favor of anchoring theory. All of these
experiments found substantial constancy with some degree of
failure. Maniatis writes ‘‘That opposite results can both be ratio-
nalized as consistentwith the anchoring theory reveals its lack of
falsiﬁability/heuristic value.’’ But again, these results are congru-
ent with each other, not opposite. Maniatis has not revealed
where a contradiction lies.
4. Maniatis argues that the Arroyo results show that ‘‘luminance
values were compared and ranked across the penumbra’’ and
this contradicts ‘‘a strong segregating role for penumbras.’’ Is
it possible that Maniatis has failed to grasp the core concept
in anchoring theory – that of co-determination? A penumbra
segregates a framework, yes. But it is not a watertight barrier.
The crosstalk between frameworks, called global anchoring,
must be factored in.
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ological convenience), the bright side of the group of surfaces in
these experiments contained no surface lighter than middle
gray.’’ This was not done for methodological convenience but
because it was this restriction of the bright side to shades of
middle gray and darker that allowed our so-called critical test.
Had a white or light gray been present on the bright side, the
two theories we were testing between would have made the
same prediction.
5. Figure/ground relations
Maniatis claims that ‘‘Anchoring theory has generally ignored or
downplayed the issue of ﬁgure-ground relations.’’ This is unfairly
pejorative. My coauthors and I have published a number of papers
exploring a possible role for ﬁgure/ground relations in lightness
(Bonato & Cataliotti, 2000; Gilchrist & Bonato, 1995; Li &
Gilchrist, 1999). What we expected to be an effect of ﬁgure/ground
turned out to an effect of relative area, due to the larger area of
ground versus ﬁgure. The absence of a ﬁgure/ground effect in those
studies is an empirical ﬁnding, not a weakness in the theory. There
is nothing in anchoring theory to prohibit a role for ﬁgure/ground
and, indeed, we have presented an image (Economou, Zdravkovic,
& Gilchrist, 2007; Gilchrist, 2006) that suggests such a role, one that
is consistent with what Kardos (1934) called the principle of the
next deeper depth plane (see Gilchrist, 2006, p. 72). For a surface
that is isolated within its own depth plane, Kardos suggests that
by default it groups with the next deeper depth plane rather than
the next nearer. Further research on this is called for.
6. Fun with the word ‘‘limited’’
Because Radonjic and Gilchrist (2013; see also Gilchrist &
Radonjic, 2010) wrote that ‘‘the local lightness computation’’ is
limited ‘‘to the target’s most immediate framework deﬁned by a
penumbra’’, Maniatis claims that our statements ‘‘contradict the
position of Gilchrist (2006), who continues to maintain that
‘‘frameworks’’ are not limited to regions of common illumina-
tion. . .’’ Here Maniatis is simply using the term ‘‘limited’’ in two
different ways. Radonjic and Gilchrist are saying that a penumbra
forms the limit of the local framework. Gilchrist (2006) is saying
that factors other than penumbra can deﬁne a framework. In other
words, a depth boundary can form the limit (or boundary) of a
framework just as a penumbra can form the limit of a framework.
Framework boundaries are not limited to penumbrae, even though
in a given case, the penumbra serves as the limit of the framework.
7. Transparency
Maniatis suggests that the Arroyo results can be explained by
assuming a ‘‘grayish overlay’’ on the bright side of the illumination
edge. There are several problems with this proposal, the most obvi-
ous being that one simply does not perceive such an overlay. She
cites Anderson and Winawer (2005) as saying that ‘‘the visual sys-
tem has a bias to treat large reductions in contrast along an edge as
indicating the presence of a transparent overlay.’’ However, no
such conditions exist in this stimulus. There are several edges that
cross the illumination boundary, but none show a reduction in
contrast; the luminance ratio is preserved across the two ﬁelds
of illumination, as Wallach noted long ago. The same error shows
up in her discussion of the Allred et al. (2012) experiments, as
Maniatis claims that ‘‘reduced contrast ratios’’ are consistent ‘‘with
very bright or very low illumination.’’ Contrast ratios do not
change with illumination level.Regarding her analysis of the Allred et al. work, Maniatis writes,
‘‘a stimulus described by Allred et al. (2012) as consistent with the
anchoring theory is actually not consistent with any of the anchor-
ing theory’s claims to date, but is consistent with known principles
of transparency.’’ Maniatis does not specify these known princi-
ples. The context suggests she is once again referring to the thesis
of Singh and Anderson (2002) (cited by Anderson & Winawer,
2005) that perceived transparency is associated with ‘‘changes in
Michelson contrast over aligned contours’’, but no such changes
over aligned contours are present in the Allred stimuli.
Maniatis complains that ‘‘The theory is also silent on the issue
of perceived transparency. . .’’ This complaint is correct. As it
stands, anchoring theory offers no account of perceived transpar-
ency. Nor has the theory formally incorporated an account of the
perception of illumination level, ultimately an essential part of
any theory of lightness. Currently those issues are best handled
by layer models.
Perhaps the most important ongoing debate in lightness theory
is that between layer models (Gilchrist, 1979; Singh & Anderson,
2002) and framework models (Bressan, 2006; Gilchrist et al.,
1999). Layer models parse the image into overlapping layers, with
an upper layer representing perceived illumination or transpar-
ency and a lower layer representing surface reﬂectance. Frame-
work models typically parse the image into adjacent frameworks,
much like different countries on a map of Europe. Both layer and
framework models capture important insights while failing to
account for important aspects of the problem. I believe that further
development will lead to a model that combines the strength of
both. The two approaches are probably not incompatible. But the
fundamental difference in the units into which the image is parsed
makes it difﬁcult to see how they might be reconciled.
8. Loose ends
Maniatis writes, ‘‘It does not seem sensible to argue that the
visual system is treating collections of non-contiguous surfaces –
but not the areas between them -as lying under a common illumi-
nation.’’ But of course this can happen. A picket fence can be seen
as uniformly illuminated even though the spaces between the
pickets appear to have a different level of illumination.
Maniatis writes both that ‘‘the theory does not contain falsiﬁ-
able principles’’ and ‘‘the theory continues to fail regularly’’. Her
contradiction here is obvious. If it is not falsiﬁable, how can it fail?
Moreover anchoring theory has been presented along with a can-
did assessment of where it fails. See for example the section enti-
tled Shortcomings of the Anchoring Model on pages 354–357 in
Gilchrist (2006). How could such a section be written if the model
were not falsiﬁable? And how many other models include such a
section?
Maniatis claims that the limited clarity of anchoring theory
gives it ‘‘a superﬁcial (and scientiﬁcally inappropriate) advan-
tage. . .’’ But if only those theories that are completely operational-
ized could be considered scientiﬁcally appropriate, there would
probably be no scientiﬁcally appropriate theories in visual percep-
tion. Of course it is appropriate to construct and develop scientiﬁc
theories, even if in their early stages, they contain some ambiguity.
Despite these differences in opinion, my colleagues and I wel-
come the kind of spirited debate exempliﬁed by the Maniatis cri-
tique. We believe that such debate is an essential part of the
scientiﬁc process and must necessarily lead to better theories.Acknowledgment
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